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 I. Introduction  
The employment consequences of long-term investments have been 
controversial in economics for a long time. This issue underlies many disputes 
between firm owners and labour unions. In some influential models of imperfectly 
competitive labour markets, for example Layard et al. (1991), investments have no 
effect on equilibrium unemployment. This is due to the specified Cobb-Douglas 
production function, which implies a constant wage elasticity of labour demand. 
This in turn means that investments or interest rates will have no effect on the wage 
determination, and therefore no effect on equilibrium unemployment.  
Several recent empirical contributions have established that the capital stock 
and related variables significantly affect wage formation and unemployment in the 
long run. Malley and Moutos (2001) find that differences in capital accumulation 
between several OECD countries explain significant elements of the unemployment 
histories in these countries. Arestis et. al. (2007) and Karanassou et. al. (2008) 
obtain significant long-run relationships between capital and labour for EMU 
countries and Nordic countries, respectively, using cointegration techniques. We 
contribute to this empirical literature in the following ways: Firstly, we design a 
model which presents structural explanations for why countries might differ with 
respect to the relationship between capital and wage formation as well as that 
between capital and unemployment. In this respect, our theoretical model establishes 
novel systematic interaction effects between long-term investments and equilibrium 
unemployment in the presence of labour market imperfections. Secondly, we present 
empirical cointegration analyses on these relationships for a broader set of countries 
than what has previously been analyzed. 
In light of the literature, the nature of the production function is a significant 
determinant of the effects of investments on equilibrium unemployment.1 Our 
analysis focuses on labour market imperfections with a production function where 
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capital and labour inputs are substitutes. Wages are determined through bargaining 
within  a  ‘right-to-manage’  framework.  We  show  that  a  higher  capital-labour  ratio  
has a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect with sufficiently strong (weak) 
labour market imperfections. Based on this mechanism we find that an increased 
capital stock decreases (increases) equilibrium unemployment if the relative 
bargaining power of the labour union is sufficiently strong (weak). Furthermore, 
theoretically we find that increases in the bargaining power of the union or the 
benefit replacement ratio promote equilibrium unemployment.      
From our theoretical results we form the empirical hypothesis that the effects 
of the capital stock on wages and unemployment are to a large extent determined by 
labour market institutions and capital-labour ratios.  In particular,  there seems to be 
no  reason  for  these  relationships  to  be  uniform across  different  countries,  a  priori.  
Instead our theory implies country-specific relationships between the capital stock 
and wages as well as capital stock and unemployment, respectively. Our empirical 
investigation explores the relationship between capital and unemployment by using 
quarterly observations for roughly 28 years in 16 OECD-countries. We find a great 
deal of disparity between the countries regarding the long-run effects of capital on 
unemployment. These dispersed long-run effects of capital on unemployment seem 
consistent with our theory, which emphasizes that the effect of the capital stock on 
wages is determined by three factors: the bargaining power, the capital-labour ratio 
and production function parameters. 
Our study proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the 
model with the time sequence of the decisions. Labour demand is studied in section 
III, and wage determination through Nash bargaining is analyzed in section IV. 
Section V analyzes equilibrium unemployment and characterizes the long-run 
effects of capital on equilibrium unemployment. We present empirical evidence in 
section VI and discuss our results in section VII. Finally, we present concluding 
comments in Section VIII. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
1  See section VII for a more detailed discussion of this issue.  
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II.   Basic Framework  
We introduce a model of wage formation with labour market imperfections. In 
the long run, at stage 1, firms commit themselves to their investment programs, 
which determine capital stocks and thereby ultimately capital-labour ratios. The 
investment  decisions  are  made  in  anticipation  of  their  effects  on  wage  setting  and  
labour demand. At stage 2, with firms committed to their investments, wage 
negotiations between firms and labour unions take place. The wage negotiations are 
conducted in anticipation of the consequences for labour demand. At stage 3 firms 
make employment decisions by taking the negotiated wages and the investment 
decisions as given.  
We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent 
sections we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward 
induction. 
             Stage 1   Stage 2   Stage 3 
                   time 
        
capital stock  wage    labour demand 
   decision  bargaining   
                                          Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
This timing structure captures the idea of long-term investment decisions, which are 
inflexible at the stage when the wage negotiations are undertaken. Such a timing 
structure seems plausible if the investments represent, for example, irreversible 
long-term technology choices. Of course, the relative timing between the negotiated 
wage setting and the investment decisions could also be reversed so as to capture 
that the negotiated outcome is a long-term contract relative to the investment 
decision (see e.g. Anderson and Devereux (1991) or Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), 
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chapter 9). Hellwig (2004) has compared a number of key properties associated with 
these two alternative timing structures within the framework of an intertemporal 
general equilibrium model. He argues that although the long-term labour demand – 
with endogenous investment – is more elastic than the short-term demand, it does 
not  necessarily  lead  to  a  less  aggressive  wage  policy. This holds true because the 
effect of the more elastic long-term demand may be more than outweighed by the 
reactions of real interest rates, to anticipated wage policies.  
We proceed by analyzing the decisions in reverse order according to the 
principles of dynamic optimization. First, we characterize labour demand and 
subsequently we analyze wage formation based on Nash bargaining. Once we have 
delineated wage formation we explore the long-term effects of the capital stock on 
equilibrium unemployment.   
 
III. Labour Demand 
We assume that the production function satisfies  
? ? ? ? ????
? 1
1
,
?
??? KLKLR ,   1??                                         (1) 
where L  is the amount of labour employed and K  is the capital stock. The 
parameter assumption 1??  implies that the production function is increasing and 
concave in the inputs. Furthermore, the parameter 0??  captures the productivity of 
capital relative to labour. Overall the production function (1) implies that labour and 
capital are substitutes. Formally, 0)(
)1(
?????
?? ?
?
??
? KLRR KLLK , which means 
that that there is a negative marginal effect of capital on the marginal product of 
labour and vice versa. 
 
At stage 3 the representative firm decides on employment so as to maximize 
the profit function 
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1
                                          (2) 
by taking both the negotiated wage, w , and the established capital stock, K , as 
given.  Thus,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  employment  decision,  the  cost  for  
creating the capital stock, Kr)1( ? , where r is the opportunity cost of capital, is 
considered a sunk investment. The necessary first-order condition associated with 
(2) is  
? ? 01 ???? ? wKLL ??? ,                                              (3) 
and the second-order condition is ? ? .01 )1( ???? ?? ????? KLLL  The first-order   
condition (3) can be expressed  as 
                                   KwL ?? ?? ?     ,                                                           (4)  
from which we can conclude that labour demand ),( KwLL ?  is a negative function 
of the capital stock, the wage and the productivity of capital stock relative to labour.  
The wage elasticity of labour demand turns out to be important later on and it 
can be expressed as   
                  )1(),(
L
K
L
w
L
wLw
L
K w ????
?
?????
?
.                                                     (5) 
As (5) shows, the wage elasticity of labour demand, 1),( ?w
L
K? , depends on 
the parameters ?  and ?  of the production function. Importantly, it also depends on 
the capital stock both directly and indirectly via L and w. 
 
IV.  Wage Negotiations  
We now proceed to investigate wage formation. Consistent with the 
introduced time sequence of decisions, we continue to consider the capital stock 
K as irreversibly given. We apply the Nash bargaining solution following the ‘right-
to-manage’ approach. This means that wage negotiations take place in anticipation 
of an optimal employment decision by the firm (see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg 
(2004), Chapter 7). The labour union’s objective function is assumed to be 
  5 
)(ˆ LNbwLU ??? , where b  denotes the (exogenous) outside option available to 
union members and N is the number of union members ( )LN ? . The labour union 
conducts the wage negotiations with NbU ?0  as the threat point. Thus, the relevant 
target function of the labour union for the negotiations is  )(ˆ bwLNbUU ???? . 
The firm conducts the wage negotiations with Kr)1(0 ????  as the treat point. This 
threat point captures the idea that the capital stock is irreversibly given at the stage 
when the wage negotiations take place. 
Following the Nash bargaining approach, the firm and the labour union 
negotiate with respect to wage to solve the following optimization problem 
      ? ? ? ? ? ?? ????? 1),()( wLKLRbwLMax
w
s.t. 0?L?                                    (6)                       
where the relative bargaining power of the labour union is ?  and that of the firm is 
)1( ?? .  
Following the standard approach for finding the Nash bargaining solution, the 
necessary first-order condition can be written as 
                                           0)1( ??? ?
??? ww
U
U ,                                                   (7) 
    where    
                          0
),()),(1(
1 ??
??
?
??
? ??
?
bw
w
L
Kbw
L
Kw
wU
U w
??
,                                   (8) 
and 
            0
),(1
11
1
11 ?
??
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
??
???
??
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
???
w
L
Kw
L
Kw
w
??
?
??
?
?
?
  .                   (9) 
     
    Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) the necessary condition for the Nash bargaining 
solution can be written according to 
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 ? ? )1)(1)(()1()1( ??????? ???????? bw
L
Kbw .  
From this equation we find the following Nash bargaining solution 
               bwKAb
L
K
L
K
wN ),,(
)1)(1()1)(1(
)1)(1()1(
?
??????
??????
?
?????
????
? .         (10)                                
where we refer to Appendix A for the crucial steps in the derivation of (9).  
According to (10) the negotiated wage is proportional to the outside option with the 
mark-up factor
)1)(1()1)(1(
)1)(1()1(
),,(
?????
????
?
??????
??????
?
L
K
L
K
wKA . This mark-up 
factor strictly exceeds one if 10 ?? ?  and it is strictly increasing as a function of 
the  bargaining  power  of  the  labour  union.  It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  
negotiated wage in (10) is reported in implicit form as both the numerator and the 
denominator in the mark-up factor depend on wage w in a non-linear way via labour 
demand and the wage elasticity of labour demand (see (4) and (5)). From a structural 
perspective the mark-up factor in (10) incorporates an important strategic link 
between the capital stock and wage formation. Formally, by (10) the negotiated 
wage depends on the capital-labour ratio LK / .  
Before initiating a detailed analysis of the relationship between the capital 
stock and wage formation we report the negotiated wage for the two special cases 
with all the bargaining power concentrated into the hands of the labour union or the 
firm, respectively. In the case of a monopoly labour union ( 1?? ) the wage is 
determined in implicit form according to 
                           b
w
L
K
w
L
K
bwN
1),(
),(
)1)(1(
)1(
1 ?
????
???
? ?
?
???
???
?
.                                (11)  
If the firm has all the bargaining power the mark-up factor is reduced to one 
according to 
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    bwN ?
?0?
.                (12) 
We now turn to a detailed analysis of the relationship between the capital stock and 
wage formation. By implicit differentiation of (10) with respect to the capital stock 
K  we find that 
bA
bA
dK
dw
w
K
?
?
1
 and by further substituting Awb /?  we  can  
characterize the effect of the capital stock on the negotiated wage according to (see 
Appendix B for details) 
                                        
A
wA
A
wA
dK
dw
w
K
N
?
?
1
,                                                                 (13) 
where   
                        01 ??
A
wAw                                                                                       (14) 
   and 
                     0
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
A
wAK if  
)1()1(
1
2 ???
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
???
??
L
K
                                        (15)               
so that  
  
                        
)1()1(
10
1 2 ???
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
??
L
K
ifonlyandif
A
wA
A
wA
dK
dw
w
K
N
    .        (16) 
  
From (16) we can draw the following general conclusion. 
Result 1 With sufficiently strong (weak) labour market imperfections, 
capital investment has a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect.  
The relationship (16) characterizes how the capital stock can serve as a strategic 
commitment device with the effect of inducing wage moderation as long as the 
relative bargaining power of the labour union exceeds the threshold determined in 
(16). This threshold is inversely related to the capital stock.  
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In particular, from (16) we can directly infer that 0
1
?
??dK
dwN , which means that 
capital investments will always moderate wages in a labour market with a monopoly 
union. Furthermore, it holds true that 0
0
?
??dK
dwN  so that in the absence of any 
labour market imperfections there is no relationship between the capital stock and 
wage formation. This seems to make sense, because the capital investments cannot 
have any wage-moderating effect if there is no wage mark-up.  
In terms of the underlying economic intuition we can identify two different 
mechanisms explaining the effects of the capital stock on wage formation.  Firstly, a 
higher capital stock increases the wage elasticity of labour demand (5), inducing 
discipline and thereby a negative effect on the wage mark-up. Secondly, as capital 
and labour are substitutes a higher capital stock will moderate the profit-reducing 
effect ?? /w  of a wage increase. From (9), an increase in the capital stock would 
promote the wage mark-up through this mechanism. The overall effect on the 
negotiated wage of an increased capital stock reflects a trade-off between these two 
forces. From (16) we can conclude that the first effect tends to dominate when the 
labour market imperfection is sufficiently strong. 
 
V.  The Effect of Capital Investment on Equilibrium 
Unemployment 
We now move on to explore the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in a 
general equilibrium framework. In this framework we are not interested in the 
adjustment process, which capture the effects of how a change in the capital stock 
impacts on the unemployment in the short run. Instead we analyze the structural 
effects of an increased capital stock on equilibrium unemployment in the long run 
for an economy consisting of a large number of identical industries. We are in this 
section only interested in the relationships between the exogenous capital stock and 
equilibrium unemployment.  
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In a general equilibrium, the term b  should be re-interpreted as the 
endogenous outside option, which we specify in a conventional way as 
                 uBwub N ??? )1( ,                                                                      (17)  
where u  is the unemployment rate, B  captures the unemployment benefit and Nw  
denotes the negotiated wage rate in all identical industries in the economy (see e.g. 
Nickell and Layard (1999) p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion). Assuming a 
constant benefit-replacement ratio NwBq ?  and substituting (17) for b  into the 
Nash bargaining solution (10) yields the equilibrium unemployment 
                ??
?
??
? ??? ),,(
11
1
1
?wKAqu
N ,                                                         (18)   
where the wage mark-up, as derived in the previous section,  is            
1
)1)(1()1)(1(
)1)(1()1(
),,( ?
?????
????
?
??????
??????
?
L
K
L
K
wKA .    
As for the impact of the capital stock on equilibrium unemployment we initially 
observe from (18) that 21
1
A
A
qdK
du K
N
?? . Combining this observation with (15) we 
can draw the conclusion that  
 
)1()1(
10
2 ???
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
???
??
L
K
ifonlyandif
Kd
du N .                      (19) 
Consequently, capital investments will reduce (increase) equilibrium unemployment 
if and only if the relative bargaining power of the labour union is sufficiently high 
(low). Analogously, we can directly infer that a higher bargaining power of the 
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labour union or an increased benefit replacement ratio always promote equilibrium 
unemployment, i.e. 0
1
1
2 ??? A
A
qd
du N ?
?  and 0
11
)1(
1
2 ???
?
??
? ??? Aqdq
du N . 
  We now summarize our analysis of equilibrium unemployment in 
Result  2 An increased capital stock decreases (increases) equilibrium 
unemployment if the relative bargaining power of the labour union is 
sufficiently strong (weak). Furthermore, an increased bargaining power of 
the union or an increased benefit replacement ratio promotes equilibrium 
unemployment.      
 
Importantly, the effects of the capital stock on equilibrium unemployment are 
primarily determined by the imperfections prevailing in the labour market, i.e. by ? . 
Capital investments reduce equilibrium unemployment if these imperfections are 
sufficiently strong so as to exceed the threshold determined in (15). This threshold is 
inversely related to the capital – labour ratio LK / .  
 
VI. Capital Stock and Equilibrium Unemployment: Empirical 
Evidence 
In this section we will investigate the relationship between capital and 
unemployment from an empirical perspective. From (16), we can see that the effect 
of the capital stock on wages is determined by three factors: the bargaining power of 
the union, the capital-labour ratio and the parameters of the production function. In 
particular, capital is more likely to impact negatively on wages if the bargaining 
power and the capital-labour ratio are high. Similarly, from Result 2  
                
)1()1(
10
2 ???
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
???
??
L
K
ifonlyandif
dK
du N  .             
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From (16) and (19) we can form the empirical hypothesis that the effects of the 
capital stock on wages and unemployment are to a large extent determined by labour 
market institutions and by capital-labour ratios. In particular, we see no reason for 
these relationships to be uniform across different countries. Instead our theory seems 
to imply country-specific relationships between the capital stock and wages as well 
as between the capital stock and unemployment.  
Our estimation strategy is to approximate the Nash bargaining solution and 
the unemployment rate with empirical steady states derived from dynamic wage and 
unemployment equations. The comparative statics properties with respect to the 
capital stock can then be obtained from the steady state coefficients for capital in 
respective equations. In principle, the estimation of these equations requires a full 
system specification for all endogenous variables, since it is difficult reconcile 
trending capital with unemployment otherwise (see Karanassou et al. (2008)). 
However, when the data are approximately difference stationary, as turns out to be 
the case in our study, the steady states take the form of cointegration relationships, 
which may yield ambiguous estimates of the coefficients. The reason is that it may 
difficult to interpret individual cointegration vectors as describing the steady states 
of either unemployment or wages, especially if these variables appear in several of 
the cointegration vectors. Therefore, it is more convenient to focus on either (16) or 
(19), and to estimate the steady state from a single equation, since this procedure 
generates unambiguous estimates, which are uniformly derived for different 
countries. This can be achieved by both adding variables which balance the trend in 
the capital stock, as suggested by Karanassou et al. (2008) in their multiple equation 
framework, and linearly detrending the series prior to estimation. We follow this 
approach and restrict our attention to (19), which seems justified in light of our 
assumed time sequence, according to which unemployment is endogenous relative 
to all other variables. This implies that the unemployment equation can be 
consistently estimated in isolation by treating all the other variables as exogenous. 
We make the simplifying assumptions that the bargaining power of the labour 
union ( ? ), the parameters of the production function ( ?? , ) and the capital-labour 
  12 
ratio ( */ LK ) are constant over time.2  We further assume that the parameters  ?  and 
? , related to the production function, are identical for each country in the sample. 
With these assumptions a log-linearized empirical steady state representation of the 
equilibrium unemployment for country j in period t takes the form  
       tjjdtjjxtjjjK
N
tj dxcku ,,,, ),,,( ?????? ???
????
,            (20) 
where )(log ,, tjtj Kc ? , tjx ,  is a vector of variables (discussed in detail below) that 
are relevant for equilibrium unemployment, tjd , collects deterministic terms, and the 
parameters jxjjK k ???? ),,,( and jd? describe the steady state relationships. Taking 
the derivative of (20) with respect to tjc , yields 
               
jKjjK
tj
N
tj k
c
u ????? ??
?
?
????
),,,(
.
,                (21) 
as an econometric representation of (19).  
A dynamic equation for unemployment corresponding to (20) is given by  
    tjtjjitj
h
i
ijitj
h
i
ijitj
h
i
ijtj dxkuu ,,3,
0
2,
0
1,
1
0, ????? ???????? ?
?
?
?
?
?
 (22) 
where the relationships between steady state parameters in (20) and the parameters 
in  (22) are given by 
     ?
?
??
?
? ??
?
??
?
?? ??
??
h
i
ij
h
i
ijjK
1
0
0
1 1 ??? , ??
??
?
? ??
?
??
?
?? ??
??
h
i
ij
h
i
ijjx
1
0
0
2 1 ???  and           
? ? ?
?
??
?
? ?? ?
?
h
i
ijjjd
1
03 1 ??? .  
Furthermore, the error terms are identically and independently distributed following 
a normal distribution ),0( 2?N  with mean zero and variance 2? . Hence an estimate 
                                               
2      In fact, it is sufficient that t? , t?  and tt LK /  are stationary variables, since in this case, they do 
not distort the long-run cointegration coefficients which are of main concern here.  
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of jK? can be recovered directly from (22). A formula for calculating the standard 
error of this parameter can be found in Bårdsen (1989). The parameter jK?  may be 
significantly different from zero when 
N
tjtjjxtjjKtj xku ,1,1,1, )( ??? ??? ??? is )0(I , whereas it is zero in a 
statistical sense otherwise.  
The sample data consist of roughly 28 years with quarterly time series 
observations for 16 OECD-countries on unemployment,  tju , ,  (the  log  of)  real  
consumer wages, tjw , , and (the log of) the real capital stock, tjc , .  In  addition,  we  
include a set of other variables which are potentially important for the determination 
of unemployment. This set is chosen to be large enough to ensure cointegration (for 
most countries), but does not exhaust the list of all possible variables suggested in 
the literature. In order to get a valid estimate of  jK?  when the data are difference 
stationary, it is sufficient that the vector of variables, tjx , , accounts for those 
stochastic trends in tju , , which are not explained exclusively by tjc , ,  since  the  
cointegration relationship is invariant to extensions of the information set. However, 
other representations of tjx ,  with the same property would do as well. In line with, 
for example, Marcellino and Mizon (2001) and Nymoen and Rodseth (2003) we 
include (the log of) average productivity, tj ,? , and consumer price inflation, tjp ,? . 
We also include the wedge between consumer and producer prices, tj ,? , to proxy 
foreign competition and indirect taxes (see Bårdsen et al. (2003)) and a measure of 
the output gap, tjy ,~ ,  based  on  a   production  function.  Detailed  definitions  and  
descriptions of the data are provided in Appendix C.  
Table 1 reports the estimates of jK?  with corresponding t-values and 
summarizes the main empirical findings from the regressions (22), where 
)~,,,,( ,,,,,, tjtjtjtjtjtj ypwx ?? ??  for each country. The lag length, h, is chosen based 
on standard information criteria. Moreover, variables in tjx ,  that have insignificant 
both long-run and short-run coefficients are excluded from the regression (the 
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column “Excl.” in Table 1). As can be seen from Table 1, both inflation and the 
wedge between consumer and producer prices were insignificant for most countries. 
Table 1 also shows that a unit-root in Ntj ,?  is rejected for most countries. For the few 
countries where cointegration is not found, i.e. Belgium, Japan and Spain, 
unemployment rates contained near I(2) components, possibly reflecting major 
structural breaks during the sample period. 
Overall, the estimates of jK? in Table 1 indicate a great deal of disparity 
between the countries and are suggestive of a more complex relationship between 
capital and labour than previously hypothesized. For roughly half of the countries, 
capital is insignificant as a determinant of unemployment in the long run. In three 
countries (Australia, Sweden, and the UK) capital has a negative long-run effect on 
unemployment, whereas this effect is positive in four countries (Canada, Finland, 
Ireland,  and  Japan).  These  dispersed  long-run  effects  of  capital  on  unemployment  
seem consistent with our theory, which emphasized that the effect of the capital 
stock on wages is determined by three factors: the bargaining power, the capital-
labour ratio and production function parameters. It is of great interest to relate these 
results to ongoing debate between the proponents of the Layard et al. (1991) 
framework, denying a lasting role for capital in unemployment determination, and 
the “aspirations gap” approach proposed by Rowthorn (1995, 1999), who argue in 
favour of such a relationship. Key to this debate has been the issue of whether the 
Cobb-Douglas specification is a reasonable representation of the production 
technology or not. Our evidence suggests that the relationship between the capital 
investments and equilibrium unemployment is more significant in some countries 
than in others. Indeed, this conclusion is consistent with a view emphasizing the 
importance of the production function. Namely, if the production function is 
captured by the Cobb-Douglas specification no such relationship is visible.  
We next investigate whether we can explain the different country-specific 
estimates of jK?  by capital-labour ratios and by proxies of the bargaining power of 
labour unions, as suggested by our theoretical model. To this end we linearize 
equation (21) according to 
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   jjejjK vk ???? ????? 210  ,                        (23) 
where the error jv depends on the following three factors: (i) the degree of non-
linearities in (.)K? , (ii) estimation errors in jK? , and (iii) other stochastic noise. 
Since the error jv is likely to be large and the number of observations is relatively 
small, the estimates tend to have a low precision. Nevertheless, we tentatively view 
the evidence as indicative for the empirical support of the predictions generated by 
our theoretical model. Table 2 reports the estimates. 
We use the average capital-labour ratio in US dollars as a measure of jk  in 
each country. As proxies for the bargaining power of labour unions we make use of 
five indices of labour market and workplace conditions, obtained from Chor and 
Freeman (2005).3 These are presented in Appendix C and we denote them by js?  (s 
= 1,...,5). The indices can range in value from 1 to 7, where higher number indicate 
more favourable conditions towards workers. We also try the mean of these indices,  
? ?? 5 1s jsj ?? , as a proxy for j? . Table 2 reports the results from the cross-country 
regressions.  As  is  evident  from  Table  2,  none  of  the  coefficient  estimates  are  
significant. This is not surprising in light of the many sources of errors and the size 
of the sample. Nevertheless, we observe that 1?  is negative in all regressions 
consistent with the prediction in (21). Moreover, 2?  is  negative  for  most  of  our  
proxies of the bargaining power of the union (except for 2j?  and 3j? , which are 
indicators of the legal and economic position of unions, as well as, the nature and 
frequency of industrial disputes, institutions for resolving labour conflicts, 
respectively). Finally, it should be noted that (23) explains only a minor proportion, 
between 5 and 10 percentage points, of the variation of jK? . 
  
                                               
     3      Du Caju et al. (2008) have studied institutional features of wage bargaining in 23 European 
countries, the US and Japan. They have demonstrated considerable heterogeneity across 
countries in the levels at which wage bargaining is conducted. 
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VII. Discussion 
As already emphasized in the introduction, some influential models of 
imperfectly competitive labour markets, for example Layard et al. (1991), have 
argued that investments have no effect on equilibrium unemployment. This is 
correct if the wage elasticity of labour demand is independent of the capital-labour 
ratio as holds true for the Cobb-Douglas production function aaLKLKR ?? 1),( , 
10 ?? a .  
Many reservations can be raised against the Cobb-Douglas specification, 
according to which the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is equal 
to one. Empirical studies using U.S. data have produced estimates of this elasticity 
which are well below one (see e.g. Lucas (1969), Chirinko (2002), Chirinko et.al 
(2004), Antras (2004)). Also empirical evidence from international data seems to 
consistently yield estimates, which do not lie in conformity with the Cobb-Douglas 
specification (see e.g. Rowthorn (1995), (1999), Berthold et. al (2002), Duffy and 
Papageorgiou (2000), Chirinko (2008), Juselius (2008) and Driver and Munoz-
Bugarin (2009)). 
A production function with a more general pattern of substitution between 
labour and capital than the Cobb-Douglas type is the CES production function 
according to 
11 1
)1(),(
??
?
?
?
?
?
? ???
? ?
??
?
?
?
?
aLKaLKR , where a , ? and ? are parameters 
satisfying 0 < a <  1,  ? >  0,  and  10 ?? ? , respectively. The parameter a is  the  
distribution parameter (see e.g. Arrow et al. (1961)), while ? captures the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labour and  10 ?? ?  captures decreasing returns 
to scale in production. As demonstrated in an earlier version of this study (Koskela 
and Stenbacka (2007)), the qualitative nature of the relationship between capital and 
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equilibrium unemployment is more complicated with the CES production function 
and it is determined by the size of the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour in addition to the determinants emphasized in the present paper.    
Overall, the CES production function can be applied to describe how 
technological features may introduce a relationship between capital and equilibrium 
unemployment. However, for the general CES production function the relationship 
between capital and equilibrium unemployment is very complex. In the present 
paper we have focused on a somewhat simpler production function, which makes it 
possible to explicitly characterize the effect of the capital stock on equilibrium 
unemployment as determined by three factors: the bargaining power, the capital-
labour ratio and parameters of the production function.   
 
VII. Conclusions  
We have explored the long-term effects of capital on equilibrium 
unemployment in a model of labour market imperfections. The model is based on a 
production function where capital and labour inputs are substitutes. Furthermore, 
wages are determined through bargaining within a ‘right-to-manage’ framework. We 
established a strategic effect of capital investments by showing that a higher capital-
labour ratio has a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect with sufficiently strong 
(weak) labour market imperfections. Based on this mechanism we found that an 
increased capital stock decreases (increases) equilibrium unemployment if the 
relative bargaining power of the labour union is sufficiently strong (weak).  
Our theoretical results supported the empirical hypothesis that the effects of 
the capital stock on wages and unemployment are to a large extent determined by 
labour market institutions and capital-labour ratios. We concluded that our theory 
would imply country-specific relationships between the capital stock and wages as 
well as between the capital stock and unemployment. Our empirical investigation 
explored the relationship between capital and unemployment by using quarterly 
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observations for roughly 28 years in 16 OECD-countries. We detected a great deal 
of disparity between the countries regarding the long-run effects of capital on 
unemployment. These dispersed long-run effects of capital on unemployment seem 
consistent with our theory, which emphasized that the effect of the capital stock on 
wages is not monotonic and determined by three factors: the bargaining power, the 
capital-labour ratio and production function parameters. 
Throughout the analysis we have assumed a homogeneous labour force. 
However, it would be very interesting to separate the labour force into a skilled and 
unskilled segment with different elasticities with respect to labour demand.4 Within 
such a richer context it might be possible to characterize qualitatively different 
interaction patterns between and capital investments and employment across the 
different labour market segments.       
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Appendix A: The Nash bargaining solution for wage 
Taking labour demand (4) into account we find that 
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which gives (9). Substituting (8) and (9) into the first-order condition (7) yields 
     
   ? ? )1)(1)(()1()1( ??????? ???????? bw
L
Kbw ,                                       (A2) 
 
which can be solved to generate the negotiated Nash bargaining solution (10). QED 
 
Appendix B:  Derivation of the relationship between the negotiated 
wage and the capital stock  
 
Implicit differentiation of (10) with respect to wage and capital stock 
bA
bA
dK
dw
w
K
?? 1  
and substituting 
A
wb ?   gives  
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By introducing the notation 
L
KX ????1  we can rewrite the mark-up as follows 
       
)1)(1()2(
)1)(1()1(
?????
?????? ????
????
XX
XXA .                                                                  (B2) 
 
Based on straightforward calculations we find that the effect of capital stock on the 
mark-up can be expressed according to 
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where 01 ???
?
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?
? ??
LL
K
L
X K
????? , so that the effect of the capital stock on the 
mark-up depends on the relative bargaining power of the labour union. Therefore                  
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Differentiating the mark-up with respect to the wage we find that  
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By using (B3) and (B5) the equation (B1) can be expressed as follows 
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By using )1)(1( ???? XXwX w ?  the denominator of (B6) can be expressed as 
follows  
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 Thus, we can draw the conclusion that  
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In particular, from (B6) we can infer that 0lim 0 ??? Kd
wd N
?  verifying that K  has 
an increasing effect on the negotiated wage for small values of ? . QED.
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Appendix C: Data 
The sample data consists of roughly 28 years of quarterly time series 
observations for the following OECD countries. Australia (AU), Belgium 
(BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Ireland 
(IR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), new 
Zeeland (NZ), Spain (SP), Sweden (SE), the UK, the US. The variable 
definitions and sources are reported here. 
 
Variable definitions and sources 
Var. Exceptions Definition Source*) 
tju ,  - Unemployment rate. OECD1 
tjc ,  - Log of total economy real capital stock. OECD2 
tjw ,   Log of real private sector wage rate. OECD2 
 BE, DK Log of the real hourly wage rate in 
manufacturing. 
OECD1 
 SP, NZ Log of real hourly earnings in all activities. OECD1 
 IR Log of total economy real compensation rate. OECD2 
tja ,  - Log of real gross domestic product (GDP) 
divided by total employment. 
OECD2 
tjp ,  - Log of consumer price index (2005 = 100). OECD2 
tj,?  - Log of ratio between consumer and producer 
prices. 
OECD1, 
OECD2 
tjy ,~  - Log of ratio between real and production 
function based  potential GDP 
OECD2 
 BE, SP Log of ratio between real GDP and HP-
filtered GDP. 
- 
jk   Average of log capital labor ratio. - 
1j?   Indicator: Wage-setting, enforcement of 
minimum wage policies, wage arrears, 
prevalence of child labour, gender 
discrimination. 
CF 
2j?   Indicator: Legal and economic position of 
unions. 
CF 
3j?   Indicator: Nature and frequency of industrial 
disputes, institutions for resolving labour 
conflicts. 
CF 
4j?   Indicator: Effect of regulations and collective 
bargaining on labour contracts, work hours, 
hiring and firing decisions. 
CF 
5j?   Indicator: Pension schemes, sickness 
benefits, unemployment insurance. 
CF 
*) OECD main economic indicators (OECD1), OECD Economic Outlook (OECD2), 
Chor and Freeman (2005) (CF). 
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Regression and cointegration results 
tj
N
tj cu ,, / ??   Regression summary 
j jK?  t-value  Sample h Excl. t-ADF, Ntj ,?  
AU -0.062 -3.88  80:1-08:2 2 tj ,? , tjp ,?  -3.58 
BE 1.765 0.27  80:1-08:2 3 - -2.52 
CA 0.059 2.35  80:1-08:1 5 tjy ,
~ , tjp ,?  -5.17 
DK 0.375 1.44  80:1-08:1 5 tjp ,?  -2.95 
FI 0.068 2.32  80:1-08:2 4 - -2.9 
FR -0.057 -1.71  80:1-08:2 2 tjp ,?  -4.43 
IR 0.021 1.96  80:1-08:2 2 - -3.75 
IT 0.008 0.18  81:1-08:2 2 tj ,? , tjp ,?  -3.28 
JP 0.082 2.06  80:1-08:2 2 tjw , , tj ,? , tjp ,?  -1.86 
NL -0.033 -1.69  80:1-08:2 2 tj ,? , tjp ,?  -3.65 
NO -0.003 -0.36  80:1-08:2 2 tj ,?  -3.33 
NZ 0.038 1.14  80:1-08:2 2 tjw , , tja ,  -4.01 
SP -0.013 -0.01  80:1-08:2 2  -2.6 
SE -0.079 -3.23  82:1-08:2 2 tjy ,
~ , tj ,? , tjp ,?  -4.09 
UK -0.139 -3.4  80:1-08:1 5 tja , , tj ,? , tjp ,?  -3.84 
US 0.036 1.44  80:1-08:2 2 tj ,? , tjp ,?  -4.11 
Table 1: Estimates of jK?  and regression summaries.  
The column labeled “Excl.” reports variables that were 
excluded from tjx , . Boldface values indicate rejection at the 
5% significance level (note that the ADF-test has a non-
standard distribution). 
 
 
 
 
Cross country regressions of jK?  on jk  and j?  
Var. 
jk , j?  jk , 1j?  jk , 2j?  jk , 3j?  jk , 4j?  jk , 5j?  
1?  )384.0( 19.0??  )360.0( 17.0??  )599.0( 29.0??  )453.0( 22.0??  )416.0( 20.0??  )278.0( 14.0??  
2?  )114.0( 15.0??  )252.0( 36.0??  )327.0( 41.0  )026.0( 03.0  )131.0( 17.0??  )375.0( 32.0??  
Table 2: Cross country regressions of jK?  on jk  and j? .  
              The numbers in parenthesis are t-values. 
 
 
 
 
